for law school applicant Sweatt and graduate school attendee McLaurin in Sweatt v. Painter and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents. In addition, they argued that a separate "Negro" law school could not provide an equal educational opportunity to Sweatt, and the restrictive conditions placed on McLaurin's college attendance deprive (sic) him of equal protection. They were joined by the U.S. solicitor general on this point. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the separate Texas law school for Negros (sic) did not afford Sweatt equal facilities, and that McLaurin must receive the same treatment at Oklahoma U as the other students. Thus, the point that Plessy should be overruled was not reached.

Counsel for black plaintiffs in the States in (sic) Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware continued to seek to have Plessy overturned by obtaining their admission to the public schools of their communities on a non- segregated basis. They succeeded in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) when the Supreme Court ruled that "segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive(s) the children of the minority group of equal education opportunities," in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The school boards in those states and the District of Columbia (also sued) were ordered in 1955 to implement a transition in their segregated schools in systems "freed of racial discrimination." In the federally administered D.C. schools to which the 14th Amendment did not apply, the Court applied the provisions of the 1791 Fifth Amendment to state "segregation in public education... imposes upon Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause."

(As explained in this chapter, this use in 1954 of a 1791