such basic and necessary learning tools as books, trained teachers, and seats for students....

The historic class-action was filed on behalf of students in eighteen schools located throughout California....

Of the eighteen schools against whom facts were alleged as having failed to supply necessary learning tools, a number were in districts which had suffered “desegregation” class actions sponsored by many of the “civil rights” groups joining in this Williams case. The targeted schools included those undergoing, or having undergone “desegregation” actions, in San Francisco, Inglewood, and, interestingly, Los Angeles, which had the largest number of the eighteen schools complained about — five.

The complaint requests, in substance,

that the Court order action be maintained as a class action;

that the California state officials be ordered to provide in their public schools:

(a) “necessary” instructional materials;
(b) “habitable” facilities;
(c) “sufficient” credentialed teachers;
(d) “equal educational opportunity” to all California public school children;

that it retain jurisdiction until this is done,
   and
award attorneys fees and expenses.

Californians face in this continuing call upon judicial power for legislative purposes a crisis similar to that faced by American citizens represented by then- Solicitor General (later Justice) Robert H. Jackson of the Roosevelt Administration. He had seen judgments in the 1930s void such legislative actions as the right to minimum wages; but was elated later to see similar legislation upheld by the Court as he had urged, and then observed, at the bar.

This Sequel chronologically relates the long struggle to regain the rightful legislative role of the people in San Diego, and turns to history to see how it can be regained by people throughout the country in pending “desegregation” actions.

Justice Jackson related how the democratic process was restored in his book, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, from which lessons can now be drawn. Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1937 to assure a voice by the Solicitor General in litigation affecting legislative functions. This voice proved to be central to the successful struggle to maintain the rightful legislative role for the people in the then-solicitor general’s time.

Similarly, a legal voice must make constitutional objections in behalf of the non-class constituents in school districts subject to discrimination in