provided, that nothing contained herein or elsewhere in this Constitution imposes upon the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any obligations or responsibilities which exceed those imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation.

After restating the modifications required by law to correct the existing mandatory racial student assignments, I concluded that review of the denial below of the writ below was called for under Section 7(a), and re-cited its expediting provision.

Not unexpectedly, the petition for review was denied on January 17, 1997.
 

What Further Could be Done
for Groundswell People Before 2000?

Strangely, I was not as disappointed as heretofore with an adverse decision, because as contrasted with my battle against the “sunset” clause I hadn’t had the same degree of hope.

Before, I had not considered the war over, but now it was for all practical purposes unless I could come up with good cause beyond what I had raised before. I knew I could count on a fair hearing, but it had to be something new and very strong against a Board and the Carlin Plaintiffs strongly committed to continuance of jurisdiction as vital to their interests.

The only possibility I saw then was the overturning of the U.S. District Court ruling staying implementation of Proposition 209, which “stay” the associates of the ACLU counsel for the Plaintiffs were so involved in obtaining and in maintaining.

For the Board, added to speculated diminution of $50 million in state integration funds, the possibility of Prop. 209 going into effect was another reason for court jurisdiction, as stated in Footnote 7 of its main argument for a lengthy “sunset” clause:

... Pursuant to the language of that proposed initiative (Prop. 209), it could be illegal for the District to continue to take race and ethnic status into account in its integration program. There is,