might happen did not present “an actual legal controversy for judicial resolution.” Id. at 421.

The Appellate Court concluded:

In sum, although the (Superior) court acknowledged Section 31’s (Proposition 209) adoption in ruling on Groundswell’s motion, the court did not conclude the section compelled it to modify its previous order. Rather, the court reviewed the action in the context of new law to revisit its prior order. Having considered it, along with other factors, the court concluded the historical basis for the court’s involvement no longer existed; District had demonstrated its commitment to desegregation; continued court supervision was no longer necessary to compel compliance with constitutional obligations; and control should be returned to District. Based on these findings, the court did not abuse its discretion in accelerating the end of supervision. Id. at 422.

This was a victory for the right of all San Diego citizens to participate on an equal basis in the governance of their school district. But it left undisturbed the denial by Superior Court of the portion of our motion to eliminate consideration of race in certain programs to bring the integration program into compliance with current federal decisional law.

Our next step necessarily was to obtain an order discharging the Writ of Mandate. This would make it possible to tackle the unconstitutionality of those aspects of the challenged programs free of any inhibition alleged by reason of a pending court order.
 

Groundswell Motion
to Discharge Writ of Mandate
is Granted, Effective July 1, 1998

On July 28, 1998 Groundswell filed a Motion That Court Issue an Order Discharging as of July 1, 1998 the Writ of Mandate. We recited that the Petition in Mandamus by the Board to the Fourth District Court of Appeal to return the termination date January 1, 2000 had been denied on February 9, 1998, but without ordering the writ of mandate discharged.