District Procedures re: Establishment and Change of Attendance Areas criteria for setting boundaries gave precedence to:

“a. Racial and Ethnic Balance” and the remaining “b” to “h” criteria failed to include “proximity” of the family home to the school as a criterion. Thereby, school boundaries prevented some kindergarteners slightly over a mile from their neighborhood elementary school from attending it, while VEEP students were bused at school expense for many miles to attend it.

The record before the Court of Appeal, filed November 30, 1997 reflects Groundswell objections to racial gerrymandering:

The Board’s gerrymandering scheme, subordinating race-neutral educational principles to racial considerations, clearly fails the applicable strict scrutiny test and is unconstitutional. This conclusion is additionally supported, by analogy, by the June 13, 1996 Supreme Court decisions invalidating racially gerrymandered voting districts in North Carolina and Texas. Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S.Ct. 1894; Bush v. Vera, 116 S.Ct. 1941.
 

Study of the Law

We next look at some briefly described modes of racial discrimination nullified recently as unconstitutional, to alert a careful study of the facts, conclusions, and decisions in other cases according to the readers’ purposes.

Seven-year old white Jacob Eisenberg successfully challenged denial of his request to go to a magnet school because of “its impact on diversity.” Underlying the notice was the determination of the school board to achieve racial balance in its schools in accordance with its countywide population. In effect, his request was denied on the basis of his race. Montgomery County Public Schools v. Eisenberg, 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999). Reversed Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public Schools, 19 F.Supp.2d 449 (D.Md. 1998). Certiorari denied 2000 U.S.Lexis 1925 (3/20/00). Compare Tuttle v. Arlington County